Tài liệu Third party in the wto dispute settlement system international experiences and lessons for vietnam

MIMISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOREIGN TRADE UNIVERSITY MASTER THESIS THIRD PARTY IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS FOR VIETNAM Specialization: The master of International Trade Policy and Law NGUYEN THI NGOC HA Ha Noi - 2019 MIMISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOREIGN TRADE UNIVERSITY MASTER THESIS THIRD PARTY IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS FOR VIETNAM Major: International economics Specialization: The master of International Trade Policy and Law Code: 8310106 Full name : Nguyen Thi Ngoc Ha Supervisor : Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Ha Ha Noi - 2019 i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I’d like to thank Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Ha, my supervisor during the research period, for his patient guidance and support. I admire not only his academic knowledge but also his personal qualities. I would also like to thank my teacher Ms. Nguyen Hong Vinh and the Faculty of University – Foreign Trade University, for giving me the opportunity to carry on my advanced studies and for their ultimate support. I would like to thank everyone in the class MITPL5 for their support in the course of the program. Finally, I would like to thank all my family members, friends and colleagues who have given me valuable support during my studies. This thesis studies on the third party in the WTO dispute system is not new but a very complicated issues required various knowledge, skills and practical experiences. Thus, the thesis has the inevitable shortcomings and limitations. I look forward to receiving valuable comments for improving the thesis. Sincerely, Hanoi, 2019 The Author Nguyen Thi Ngoc Ha ii CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that the thesis with the title: “Third party in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Experiences and Lessons for Vietnam” is my own research and does not reproduce any other materials. The data indicated in the thesis is clear, accurate and are collected from the confident sources of information. The Author Nguyen Thi Ngoc Ha iii TABLE OF CONTENT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................ i TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ..............................................................................v LIST OF CHART/ TABLE .................................................................................... vi INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 1: THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM ........................................................................................5 1.1. Overview of the WTO dispute settlement system of WTO ........................5 1.1.1. History of the establishment and development of the WTO dispute settlement system .................................................................................................5 1.1.2. Principles of WTO dispute settlement system. .........................................8 1.1.3. Dispute settlement Bodies .......................................................................11 1.1.4. Dispute settlement process. .....................................................................16 1.2. WTO rules on third party intervention ......................................................25 1.2.1. Identification ...........................................................................................25 1.2.2. Conditions for becoming a third party ...................................................26 1.2.3. The third party status in each stage of dispute settlement. ...................26 1.2.4 The role of third party intervention .........................................................30 CHAPTER 2: PRACTICES INVOLVED IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AS THIRD PARTY OF SOME WTO MEMBERS ...................................................32 2.1. The developed country members ................................................................35 2.1.1. Japan .......................................................................................................36 2.1.2. The United States of America. ................................................................39 2.2 The developing countries members .............................................................43 2.2.1 China ........................................................................................................46 2.2.2. India.........................................................................................................52 2.2.3. Thailand ..................................................................................................54 2.3. General evaluation and lessons for Vietnam .............................................55 2.3.1 General evaluation ...................................................................................55 2.3.2. Lessons for Vietnam ...............................................................................57 iv CHAPTER 3: PRACTICES OF VIETNAM INTERVENTION AS THIRD PARTY IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS. .......................................................................................59 3.1. Practices of Vietnam’s intervention as third party. ..................................59 3.1.1 Classification ............................................................................................59 3.1.3. Legal basis and mechanisms of participation in Vietnam ....................65 3.2. General evaluation and some orientation for Vietnam.............................72 3.2.1. Evaluation of achieved results ...............................................................72 3.2.2 Some orientation for Vietnam .................................................................75 3.3. Recommendations.........................................................................................79 3.3.1. For the Government................................................................................79 3.3.2. To enterprises ..........................................................................................85 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................88 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................90 APPENDIX ..............................................................................................................93 v TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 1 AB Appellate Body 2 ACWL Advisory Centre for WTO Law 3 AD Anti- Dumping 4 DSB Dispute Settlement Body 5 DSM Dispute Settlement Mechanism 6 DSS Dispute Settlement System 7 DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding 8 EU European Union 9 GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 10 MFN Most Favoured Nation 11 SCM Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 12 SG Safeguard 13 SPS Snaitary and Phytosanitary Measures 14 TRIMs Trade-Related Investment Measures 15 TRIPs Trade-Related to Aspects of Interllectual Property Rights 16 US United State 17 WTO World Trade Organization vi LIST OF CHART/ TABLE Chart 1.1: WTO Dispute Settlement Process ............................................................15 Chart 2.1: WTO members most involved in disputes, 1995 to 2017 ........................32 Chart 3.1: Participate as a third party of Vietnam.....................................................60 Table 2.1: Top countries access WTO DSS as third party........................................33 Table 2.2: World’s export countries in 2017..................................................................33 Table 2.3: World’s import countries 2017 ................................................................33 Table 2.4: Participate as a third party of developed members. .................................36 Table 2.5: Participate as a third party of developing members. ................................46 vii ABSTRACT The thesis provides a theoretical overview of third party invention in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. We’ll have the knowledge about WTO Dispute Settlement System, identification of third party and the rights and role of the third parties in a dispute case. The thesis also carefully studies the practices of some WTO member both developed and developing countries (Japan, the USA, China, India, and Thailand) that frequently involved in WTO Dispute Settlement System as a third party. The studies show the root reason, the benefit which these members get when they participate as a third party and the way they organize the related resources and building regulation and law. The thesis analyzes the practice of Vietnam intervention as a third party in the WTO Settlement System, its achieved results and restrictions until now. From these characteristics of Vietnam and international experiences gives the orientations and proposes some recommendations to improve Vietnam’s participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Research rationale Every economy that wants to grow and develop must participate in international trade activities, participate in the international economy. Thanks to bilateral and multilateral economic agreements, the international economy is increasingly developing and closely linked to benefits. In which, there are over 95% of world trade activities currently governed by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreements1. This international organization was established and operated since January 1st, 1995 with the goal of establishing and managing a free and transparent global trade. This organization inherits, develops the rules, and practices implementing the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs - GATT 1947 (limited to trade in goods only) and is a direct result of the Uruguay Round (covering the areas of trade in goods, services, intellectual property and investment. As of March, 2019, this organization has 164 members. Through agreements, countries have an opportunity to cooperate not only in trade but also in some social fields. However, deeper participation in the world economy will breed conflicts of interest among member countries. These conflicts sometimes become cornerstones that prevent trade flows between nations. To ensure the full and serious implementation of the provisions of the Agreement, prevent trade measures that violate the Agreements, contribute to the implementation of the WTO's great objectives, a disputes settlement system within this organization have been established. This mechanism is the realization of the trend of legalizing the process of settling international trade disputes today, gradually replacing the methods of resolving political and diplomatic disputes in this area. WTO has one of the most active international dispute settlement system in the world. Since 1995, over 500 disputes have been brought to WTO and over 350 rulings have been issued2. Ian F. Fergusson, “The World Trade Organization: Background and Issues”, CRS Report for Congress, Updated May 9, 2007, available at: https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/98-928.pdf (consulted on 12 December 2018). 2 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (consulted on 15 February 2018). 1 2 As a member of WTO, Vietnam can use this mechanism for settling possible trade disputes with other WTO members. The consideration of this dispute settlement mechanism and its massive case system are of great practical significance not only in understanding the provisions of the WTO Agreements, but also in protecting them. However, the participation as a plaintiff or a defendant often requires high manpower, experiences and skills as well as financial resources. Then, participation as a third party constitutes a very interesting option, because it will be an opportunity to not only reinforce the Members’ presence in the DSS, but also to allow them to learn and accumulate experience when the WTO dispute settlement process is becoming more and more technical. In the practice, some WTO’s Members, as the United States, the European Union, Japan, China and other developing Members have profited from its participation as third party in DSS. From this point of view, Vietnam could use third party intervention as a legal instrument for reinforce its participation in the DSS. Nonetheless, for more than 10 years of participating in DSS, Vietnam did not consider third party intervention as a useful tool, especially in order to strengthen its capacities. Therefore, what are WTO’s rules governing third party intervention in DSS? What is the role of third party and third party intervention in this mechanism? How are international experiences on this issue? How can Vietnam use these international experiences to gain practical benefits to reinforce its role in DSS? To answer these questions, I have chosen the topic “Third party in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Experiences and Lessons for Vietnam” as my graduation thesis topic. 2. Literature review Given the practical benefits, WTO members actively involve in dispute settlement system at the WTO as a third party. Vietnam is also aware of this issue and is actively participating in this capacity in the DSU dispute settlement cases. Since the date of accession (January 11th, 2007), Vietnam has so far participated in 38 cases, in 5 of which cases stood as plaintiffs and participated as a third party in 33 cases. However, in terms of theoretical basis and research projects of scale and overall, this regulation in Vietnam has not been properly concerned. 3 In the curricula of law schools and economics of our country, the law has not mentioned the system of participating in the settlement of trade disputes of WTO as a third party both in terms of theory and Practice. Also, in scientific works in specialized journals such as Journal of Law, Law and State Magazine ... mentioned the above issue, however, these studies only study participation. The WTO's general dispute settlement system has not studied in depth the WTO dispute settlement system as a third party. Some monographs, documents, articles related to WTO and dispute settlement system of WTO can be mentioned as: Participating in trade dispute settlement mechanism as a third party (Vu Quoc Khanh, Faculty of Law - Hanoi National University 2012); China participates as a third party into the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement mechanism and experiences for Vietnam (Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Ha - Law and State magazine No11 (343), 2016). Foreign experience and strengthening Vietnam's participation in dispute settlement mechanism at the World Trade Organization (WTO) (VNU Journal of Science - Law No. 28, pages 165–181) and “Some issues from a procedural perspective in Vietnam's first lawsuit at WTO” (Journal of Legislative Studies No. 16, pages 19–29); Acessing the WTO Settlement System as a third party (website: http://chongbanphagia.vn – 24/9/2014); Improving the effectiveness of Vietnam's participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (http://isl.vass.gov.vn 10/3/2015)… 3. Objectives of the research The thesis focuses on studying the issue of joining WTO's dispute settlement system (hereinafter referred to as DSU) as a third party with the aim of determining the legal basis and experiences from the praticial particiapation as third party of some members, thereby drawing lessons for Vietnam. This research also focuses on analyzing the practice of Vietnam’s participation in WTO’s DSS as third party, and on proposing for Vietnam some recommendations in order to improve its participation in this system in the upcoming dispute resolution cases of WTO. 4. Scope of the research 4 In the context of international economic integration today, the issue of resolving trade disputes arising between countries has always been recognized as complex and diverse. On the other hand, with the development of current international relations, the practice of resolving disputes in international organizations in general and WTO in particular has been posing many issues that need to be addressed research center. The thesis does not address all the issues, but focuses on the following contents: Theoretical issues of participating in the WTO trade dispute settlement system as a third party; the practice of participating in the WTO dispute settlement system as a third party of some WTO’s Members and Vietnam; recommendations for Vietnam to improve its participation in the WTO's dispute settlement system as a third party. 5. Methodology The topic is studied on dialectical materialist perspective, combined with methods of statistical analysis, synthesis methods, comparisons, historical methods and developmental methods. The thesis is also carried out from the point of view of the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam through guidelines and policies on economic integration and development in the new era. The thesis is presented by the method of analysis, interpretation and inductive combined with comparative and statistical methods. 6. Outline of the thesis. In addition to the introduction and conclusion and lists of references, abbreviations ... the thesis is divided into three chapters as follows: Chapter 1: Third party intervention in the WTO Dispute Settlement System Chapter 2: Practices involved in dispute settlement as a third party of some WTO Members Chapter 3: Practices of Vietnam intervention as third party in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and recommendations 5 CHAPTER 1: THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1.1. Overview of the WTO dispute settlement system of WTO 1.1.1. History of the establishment and development of the WTO dispute settlement system World Trade Organization (WTO) came into existence since the 1st of January 1995. It was the result of the Uruguay Round (1986-1995) with the precursor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947). According to calculations, there are over 95% of commercial activities in the world today are governed by the Agreement of this Organization3. 1.1.1.1. Dispute settlement mechanism of GATT 1947 The dispute settlement mechanism of GATT 1947 was built on the basis of Article XXII and Article XXIII of the GATT Agreement. Article XXII provides for consultations procedures between the signatories regarding the application and implementation of GATT. Article XXIII provides for the conciliation procedure between dispute parties in the case of a nullification of commercial rights or impairment due to the acts of a contracting party other. The GATT 1947 Agreement stipulates that the body competent to settle disputes is the GATT General Assembly. In fact, most of the dispute resolution was entrusted to the working groups and from 1952 to expert groups by the GATT General Assembly GATT's dispute settlement mechanism is more “reconciled” than “litigated”, which aims to make the parties of dispute better understand each other to come up with a solution that is acceptable to both sides. The reconciliation task was assigned to the expert team, consisting of 03 or 05 members who were often selected among diplomats working at a delegation in Ian F. Fergusson, “The World Trade Organization: Background and Issues”, CRS Report for Congress, Updated May 9, 2007, available at: https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/98-928.pdf (consulted on 12 December 2018). & 3 http://www.trungtamwto.vn/wto/gioi-thieu-co-che-giai-quyet-tranh-chap/gioi-thieu-ve-co-che-giaiquyet-tranh-chap-trong-wto (consulted on 15 January 2019). 6 Geneva or government officials of third countries who have experienced years on GATT’s issues. The expert team is responsible for objectively reviewing the content of the dispute, any violation of the agreement and any possible damages to a party of dispute and will prepare a report to submit to the GATT General council to consider. The approval of report is based on the principle of positive consensus. Positive consensus meant that there had to be no objection from any contracting party to the decision. However, this principle made it difficult for the GATT dispute settlement mechanism because, in theory, any signatory could oppose or delay the establishment of expert groups and blockade through reports. One might think that such a system could not possibly have worked. Why would a respondent not use its right to block the establishment of a panel if it thought that it might lose the case? Why would the losing party not block the adoption of the panel report? How could a party refrain from using its veto against the authorization of countermeasures, from which it would suffer economically? If domestic judicial systems were to operate on the basis of such a consensus rule, they would probably fail in most instances. The delay in resolving disputes in many cases has not resulted in a practical effect for the prevailing party because the damaged product or industry has lost competitiveness after a period of dispute resolution prolonged. Certainly, there were a significant number of disputes that were never brought before the GATT because the complainant suspected that the respondent would exercise its veto. Thus, the risk of a veto also weakened the GATT dispute settlement system. In addition, such vetoes actually occurred, especially in economically important or politically sensitive areas such as anti-dumping. Finally, there was a deterioration of the system in the 1980s as contracting parties increasingly blocked the establishment of panels and the adoption of panel reports. In addition, the adoption of a number of Codes of the 1979 Tokyo round with separate dispute settlement mechanisms (government procurement, civil aviation ...) has affected uniformity and weakening the general dispute settlement mechanism of 7 GATT. Some new disputes arise as disputes over trade measures related to investment, on protection of intellectual property rights, on trade in services ... are not under the jurisdiction of GATT 1947 and resolution of such disputes outside the multilateral trading system has sometimes led to unilateral sanctions for developing countries. 1.1.1.2. WTO dispute settlement mechanism As the inherent problems in the GATT dispute settlement system led to increasing problems in the 1980s, many contracting parties to GATT 1947, both developing and developed countries, felt that the system needed improving and strengthening. Negotiations on dispute settlement were accordingly included and given high priority on the agenda of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is an inheritance of the rules for dispute settlement that have promoted positive effects for nearly 50 years in GATT 1947 history. Learning from the shortcomings in the old mechanism, some fundamental improvements have been included in the new mechanism, contributing significantly to improve the trial nature of this procedure as well as strengthening the binding of dispute resolution decisions. The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism is built on four principles: they are basically fair, fast, effective and acceptable to the parties of dispute, consistent with the goal of preserving the rights and obligations, in accordance with the relevant trade agreements on the basis of compliance with the rules of international customary law on interpretation of international treaties. Arguably, the most important innovation is that the DSU eliminated the right of individual parties, typically the one whose measure is being challenged, to block the establishment of panels or the adoption of a report. Now, the DSB automatically establishes panels and adopts panel and Appellate Body reports unless there is a consensus not to do so. This “negative” consensus rule contrasts sharply with the practice under the GATT 1947 and also applies, in addition to the establishment of panels and the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports, to the authorization of countermeasures against a party which fails to implement a ruling. 8 Other important new features of the (WTO) dispute settlement system are the appellate review of panel reports and a formal surveillance of implementation following the adoption of panel (and Appellate Body) reports. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is now seen as the most effective dispute settlement mechanism in the international legal system. This mechanism not only serves as a judicial body but also as a mechanism to prevent disputes, help balancing the rights and obligations of WTO members. It performs three main functions: (i) ensure that the multilateral trading system operates safely and predictably by strengthening and enforcing the mandatory enforcement of the law (rule of law); (ii) ensure the rights and obligations of WTO members; (iii) clarify these rights and obligations through the interpretation of the WTO Agreement in accordance with customary rules of international legal interpretation. With these functions, the claimants are required to comply with their commitments under the relevant agreements. The recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body are enforceable to the parties in the dispute. 1.1.2. Principles of WTO dispute settlement system. In the process of settling disputes between WTO members, these disputes are resolved on the basis of WTO rules comply with the following specific principles: 1.1.2.1. Prompt settlement of disputes The DSU emphasizes that prompt settlement of disputes is essential if the (WTO) is to function effectively and the balance of rights and obligations between the Members is to be maintained (Article 3.3 of the DSU). It is well known that, to be achieved, justice must not only provide an equitable outcome but also be swift. Accordingly, the DSU sets out in considerable detail the procedures and corresponding deadlines to be followed in resolving disputes. The detailed procedures are designed to achieve efficiency, including the right of a complainant to move forward with a complaint even in the absence of agreement by the respondent (Articles 4.3 and 6.1 of the DSU). If a case is adjudicated, it should normally take no more than one year for a panel ruling and no more than 16 months if the case is 9 appealed (Article 20 of the DSU). If the complainant deems the case urgent, consideration of the case should take even less time (Articles 4.9 and 12.8 of the DSU). The essential issue for effective implementation of WTO functions and maintaining the appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of members is the quick resolution of disputes (Article 3.3 of the DSU). Therefore, once the direct or indirect benefit of the member in accordance with the relevant Agreement is violated, it must be protected quickly. 1.1.2.2. Principles of efficiency The effectiveness of WTO dispute settlement systems is ability to provide easy access to all member states, to resolve disputes in a relatively short time, and to ensure that rulings are complied with within a reasonable period of time. In order to protect the rights of the disputing parties, the members expressed their determination to enhance the effectiveness of the dispute resolution. This is affirmed in Article 4.1 of the DSU "Members affirmed their determination to enhance and improve the effectiveness of consultations used by Members", in order to be effective specified in the consultation period, a first procedure in the dispute resolution process. In addition, during the entire process of the WTO dispute settlement process, the parties to the dispute favored a negotiated solution that could be acceptable to the parties Article 3.7 of the DSU). 1.1.2.3. Confidentiality This principle in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is embodied in conducting consultations and organizing the Panel meetings as well as the proceedings of the appellate hearing process. Accordingly to this principle, the consultation process must be kept confidential (Article 4.6 of the DSU: "The consultation process must be kept confidential, and must not prejudice the rights of any Member in any process."), meetings of the Panel must be conducted in a nonpublic manner whereby the disputing parties and interested parties may only attend when invited by the Panel (Point 2, Annex) Table 3 of the DSU on working procedures: “The panel must be closed. The parties to the dispute, and interested 10 parties, must be present at meetings only when invited by the Panel”. The proceedings of the Appellate Body (AB) must be kept confidential (Article 17.10 of the DSU: "The Appellate Body's proceedings must be kept confidential. Newspapers The Appellate Body's report must be drafted without the participation of the parties to the dispute and in the spirit of the information provided and the opinions raised "). 1.1.2.4. Mutual acceptance Although the dispute settlement system is intended to uphold the rights of aggrieved Members and to clarify the scope of the rights and obligations, which gradually achieves higher levels of security and predictability, the primary objective of the system is not to make rulings or to develop jurisprudence. Rather, like other judicial systems, the priority is to settle disputes, preferably through a mutually agreed solution that is consistent with the WTO Agreement (Article 3.7 of the DSU). Adjudication is to be used only when the parties cannot work out a mutually agreed solution. By requiring formal consultations as the first stage of any dispute, the DSU provides a framework in which the parties to a dispute must always at least attempt to negotiate a settlement. Even when the case has progressed to the stage of adjudication, a bilateral settlement always remains possible, and the parties are always encouraged to make efforts in that direction (Articles 3.7 and 11 of the DSU). WTO Members have agreed to use the multilateral system for settling their WTO trade disputes rather than resorting to unilateral action (Article 23 of the DSU). That means abiding by the agreed procedures and respecting the rulings once they are issued and not taking the law into their own hands. 1.1.2.5. Negative consensus principle The principle of veto consensus (also known as the reverse consensus principle) is expressed in Article 6.1, Article 16.4 and Article 17.14 of the DSU. In accordance with this principle, the decision of the DSB, the establishment of a Panel, the report of the Panel, the Appellate Body's report will not be passed unless all members The DSB agreed to not approve. 11 In practice this rule allows the report to be adopted quasi-automatically. After the establishment of a panel the adoption of a panel report by the DSB is the second key instance in which the decision-making rule of negative consensus applies in the WTO dispute settlement system. The quasi-automatic adoption of a panel report pursuant to the negative consensus rule is important because the panel's report only becomes binding after the DSB has adopted it. 1.1.2.6 Although this is not a principle recognized in the DSU, it is acknowledged from AB's dispute settlement practice. The outcome of the resolution process is the decision and recommendation of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Under the provisions of the DSU, rulings and recommendations should not increase or decrease the rights and obligations of the parties stipulated in the relevant agreements (Article 3.2 of the DSU)4 . At the same time, decisions on dispute settlement are not eliminated or reduced the benefits that any WTO member has the provisions of the relevant agreements (Article 3.5 of the DSU)5. 1.1.3. Dispute settlement Bodies The dispute settlement procedure in the WTO is carried out by different bodies, each with its own function, creating independence in the investigation activity and adopting decisions in this mechanism. 1.1.3.1. Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) According to article IV.3 of the WTO Agreement, “The General Council shall convene as appropriate to discharge the responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement “2.The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements”. 5 “5. All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with those agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of those agreements”. 4